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Axiom weakening is a novel technique that allows
for fine-grained repair of inconsistent ontologies.
In a multi-agent setting, integrating ontologies cor-
responding to multiple agents may lead to incon-
sistencies. Such inconsistencies can be resolved af-
ter the integrated ontology has been built, or their
generation can be prevented during ontology gen-
eration. We implement and compare these two ap-
proaches. First, we study how to repair an inconsis-
tent ontology resulting from a voting-based aggre-
gation of views of heterogeneous agents. Second,
we prevent the generation of inconsistencies by let-
ting the agents engage in a turn-based rational pro-
tocol about the axioms to be added to the integrated
ontology. We instantiate the two approaches using
real-world ontologies and compare them by mea-
suring the levels of satisfaction of the agents w.r.t.
the ontology obtained by the two procedures.
1 Introduction
Ontologies are increasingly being used in a variety of present-
day applications. Nonetheless, ontology engineering is a hard
and error-prone task, where even small changes may lead to
unforeseen errors, in particular to inconsistency. The need for
repairing ontologies is particularly crucial when they are de-
veloped by different agents. However, integrating ontologies
provided by agents presents a certain advantage, in that their
opinions can be used to drive the repair.
Ontology integration requires some ways to compute com-
promises without sacrificing consistency. Relying on sim-
ple and well-known decision methods like majority voting
[Brandt et al., 2016; Zwicker, 2016] is not enough as they
are prone to yield inconsistent ontologies [Porello and En-
driss, 2014]. We propose to obtain consistent compromises
that reflect the opinions of agents (voters, citizens, experts,
etc.) by repairing the inconsistent aggregated ontologies by
weakening the axioms.
This work goes beyond existing methods for ontology
aggregation based on ontology matching and alignment
(e.g., [Euzenat, 2015; 2017; Solimando et al., 2017; Jime´nez-
Ruiz et al., 2016]) and on social choice [Porello and En-
driss, 2014]. On the one hand, we deal with global incon-
sistency, and we do not confine ourselves to ontology align-
ments, by actually integrating the agents’ information; on the
other hand, we use axiom weakening to solve in a fine way
the inconsistencies that arise from the integration, namely, by
building new formulas that balance the agents’ opinions.
In our setting, we have a set of agents who need to build
an ontology about a specific knowledge domain. We start
with an agenda, which is a (typically inconsistent) set of state-
ments about the domain, expressed as axioms in a description
logic. Each agent submits a (consistent) subset of the agenda,
and a preference profile, i.e., a total ordering over the agenda
reflecting the importance they give to each axiom. We con-
sider two social approaches to ontology aggregation: vote ag-
gregation and turn-based.
In the vote aggregation approach, we fix an aggregation
procedure, e.g. majority. The subsets are aggregated into one
unique subset of the agenda, which is very likely inconsis-
tent, and needs to be ‘repaired.’ Repairing an ontology can
be done in various ways. One common way, a case of coarse
repair, is to minimally remove axioms that are the cause of
the inconsistency. Here, on the other hand, we propose a fine
repair method based on axiom weakening. This has the puta-
tive advantage of retaining more information than the coarse
repairs. To enable axiom weakening one has to select a con-
sistent reference ontology that contains enough information.
For this purpose, we take advantage of the preference pro-
file submitted by the agents. We propose a novel method for
choosing a reference ontology from a preference profile over
the agenda, and we study its formal properties. Finally, the
reference ontology is used to repair the aggregated ontology.
In the turn-based approach, we let the agents take turns
when adding their ‘favorite’ axiom to a set of previously se-
lected axioms in a possibly arbitrary order. When their fa-
vorite axiom cannot be added without causing an inconsis-
tency, this axiom is weakened, using the reference ontology
obtained from the orderings submitted by the agents. The
procedure ends when all the axioms of the agenda that are
supported by at least one agent have been considered.
Analogous approaches exist in social choice in the form of
multiwinner rules, which among others find applications in
parliamentary elections, portfolio/movie selection, or short-
listing [Elkind et al., 2017]. Specific multiwinner elections
do not always obey general requirements or principles. For
instance, in portfolio selection, one should care mostly about
diversity. This is quite the opposite in shortlisting, as one
typically looks for a set of similar candidates. In parliamen-
tary elections, we mostly value the proportional representa-
tion of the electorate. Different rules will perform differently
depending on the application, and finding a more appropri-
ate one is difficult. Experimentation can prove more useful
than theory. In the paper, we lay out such an experimentation
to compare our fine repair approaches against coarse repair
approaches based on axiom removal and unanimity selection.
2 Preliminaries
An ontology is a set of formulas in an appropriate logical
language with the purpose of describing a particular domain
of interest. The precise logic used is not crucial for our ap-
proach as most techniques introduced apply to a variety of
logics; however, for the sake of clarity we use description
logics (DLs) as well-known ontology languages. We briefly
introduce the basic DL ALC; for full details see [Baader et
al., 2003]. Syntactically, ALC is based on two disjoint sets
NC and NR of concept names and role names, respectively.
The set of ALC concepts is generated by the grammar
C ::= A | ¬C | C u C | C unionsq C | ∀R.C | ∃R.C ,
whereA ∈ NC andR ∈ NR. A TBox is a finite set of general
concept inclusions (GCIs) of the formC v D whereC andD
are concepts. It stores the terminological knowledge regard-
ing the relationships between concepts. An ABox is a finite
set of assertions C(a) and R(a, b), which express knowledge
about objects in the knowledge domain. An ontology is com-
posed by a TBox and an ABox.
The semantics of ALC is based on interpretations of the
form I = (∆I , ·I), where ∆I is a non-empty domain, and ·I
is a function mapping every individual name to an element of
∆I , each concept name to a subset of the domain, and each
role name to a binary relation on the domain. I satisfies C v
D iff CI ⊆ DI and I satisfies an assertion C(a) (R(a, b)) iff
aI ∈ CI ((aI , bI) ∈ RI ). The interpretation I is a model of
the ontology T if it satisfies all the GCIs and all the assertions
in T . T is consistent if it has a model. Given two concepts C
and D, C is subsumed by D w.r.t. the ontology T (C vT D)
if CI ⊆ DI for every model I of T . We write C ≡T D when
C vT D and D vT C.
We denote byDL an arbitrary DL, and by L(DL, NC , NR)
the set of (complex) concepts built over NC and NR in DL.
Refining knowledge and weakening axioms
Refinement operators are well-known in Inductive Logic Pro-
gramming, where they are used to learn concepts from exam-
ples. In this setting, two types of refinement operators exist:
specialisation refinement operators and generalisation refine-
ment operators. While the former construct specialisations of
hypotheses, the latter construct generalisations [van der Laag
and Nienhuys-Cheng, 1998].
Given the quasi-ordered set 〈L(DL, Nc, NR),v〉, a gener-
alisation refinement operator satisfies
γT (C) ⊆ {C ′ ∈ L(DL, Nc, NR) | C vT C ′} .
A specialisation refinement operator satisfies
ρT (C) ⊆ {C ′ ∈ L(DL, Nc, NR) | C ′ vT C} .
Generalisation refinement operators take a conceptC as input
and return a set of descriptions that are more general than
C by taking an ontology T into account. A specialisation
operator, instead, returns a set of more specific descriptions.
Our objective is not to propose new refinement operators.
Instead, the proposal laid out in this paper can make use of
any such operators. To ensure the termination of the proce-
dures, we require that the following holds
> ∈ γ∗T (C) and ⊥ ∈ ρ∗T (C) (1)
(where op∗ denotes the unbounded finite iteration of the re-
finement operator op). That is, every concept can be gen-
eralised into > and specialised into ⊥ in a finite number of
steps. When specific refinement operators are needed, as in
the examples and in the experiments, we use the refinement
operators from [Troquard et al., 2018].
We can now define the notion of axiom weakening. The
set of all weakenings of an axiom w.r.t. a reference ontology
T is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Axiom weakening). Given a GCI C v D of
T , the set of (least) weakenings of C v D w.r.t. T , denoted
by gT (C v D), is the set of all axioms C ′ v D′ such that
C ′ ∈ ρT (C) and D′ = D or C ′ = C and D′ ∈ γT (D).
Given an assertional axiom C(a) of T , the set of (least)
weakenings of C(a), denoted gT (C(a)) is the set of all ax-
ioms C ′(a) such that C ′ ∈ γT (C).
For every axiom ϕ, the axioms in the set gT (ϕ) are weaker
than ϕ.
Lemma 2. For every axiom ϕ, if ϕ′ ∈ gT (ϕ), then ϕ |=T ϕ′.
3 Computing the Reference Ontology
Our two axiom weakening-based approaches rely on a ref-
erence ontology. We define specifically how to choose this
ontology and study its formal and computational aspects.
We consider an arbitrary but fixed DL ontology Φ, called
the agenda, and a fixed integer number k, which refers to
the number of voters building the reference ontology. We as-
sume that every agent i provides a total ordering <i over the
axioms in the agenda, which represents the priority given to
that axiom in the choice of the reference ontology; that is, ax-
ioms that are lower in the total ordering<i are more preferred
by agent i. We want to select a maximally consistent subset
(or repair) of the agenda on which the agents agree. We will
use the agents’ preferences to determine the best repair. First,
we introduce the following notion of lexicographic ordering,
that extends the ordering on elements of a set X to elements
of the power set of X .
Definition 3. Let X be a set, < a total ordering on X , and
W,W ′ ⊆ X . W is lexicographically smaller than W ′, W ≺
W ′, iff there exists some x ∈ X such that x ∈ W \W ′ and,
for all y < x, either y ∈W ∩W ′ or y /∈W ∪W ′.
This definition was introduced in particular in the context
of finding maximally consistent sets of an ontology [Pen˜aloza
and Sertkaya, 2017; Johnson et al., 1988], motivated by its
computational properties. In the literature of social choice,
the problem of defining an ordering on sets from an ordering
on objects is related to the problem of ranking sets of ob-
jects [Barbera` et al., 2004]. We assess our previous definition
from a social choice theoretical perspective. Extending an
ordering from objects to sets of objects requires deciding an
interpretation of the preferences over sets. Suppose x < y. In
principle, one could define an ordering on sets that satisfies
either {x} ≺ {x, y} or {x, y} ≺ {x}. In the former case,
the intuition is that getting the set {x, y}means receiving one
between the mutually incompatible options x and y, without
deciding which one. Therefore, since x is better than y, get-
ting x is better than randomly getting one between x and y.
In the latter case, the intuition is that getting {x, y} means
getting the mutually compatible x and y (or getting one be-
tween the two but we can choose which one). Hence {x, y} is
better than the sole {x}. Definition 3 embraces the second in-
terpretation, for which any super set of a set is better than the
smaller set. In this context of mutually compatible objects,
an important property is additive representability [Barbera` et
al., 2004]. We establish it in the following lemma.
Lemma 4. The relation ≺ is additive representable; that is,
there exists a utility function u such that:







One possible utility function that represents ≺ is defined
by u(x) = 2u0(x), where for xm < xm − 1 < · · · < x1,
u0(xj) = j. To generalize this notion to the preferences of
several agents (i.e., to consider several orderings simultane-
ously), we introduce some notation. Given a total ordering
< over X , [n]< denotes the n-th element of X according
to <. Given a set X with |X| = m, a profile of total or-
ders α = (<1, . . . , <k) over X , and W ⊆ X , we define for
each n, 1 ≤ n ≤ m the value [n]Wα = |{i | [n]<i ∈ W}|.
That is, [n]Wα expresses the number of orderings in α whose
n-th element appears in W . We denote by Wα the m-tuple
([1]Wα , . . . , [m]
W
α ).
Definition 5 (Collective Ordering). Let θ, θ′ be twom-tuples.
We say that θ is lexicographically smaller than θ′ (denoted
θ <lex θ
′) iff there is an n, 1 ≤ n ≤ m such that θn > θ′n and
for all `, 1 ≤ ` < n, θ` = θ′`.
Let X be a set with |X| = m, α a profile of lexico-
graphic orderings over X , and W,W ′ ⊆ X . Then W is




Clearly, W ≺α W ′ can be decided in linear time on the
size of X and the number of agents: one can simply compute
[n]Wα and [n]
W ′
α for all n, 1 ≤ n ≤ m until these values differ.
Note that Definition 3 is a special case of Definition 5 where
α has only one ordering relation, and hence [n]W is always
either 1 (if the element belongs to the set) or 0 (if it does not).
Contrary to standard lexicographic ordering, ≺α may have
several different minima, among a class of subsets ofX; thus,
there may exist several collectively best repairs. However, all
these minima are equally satisfying to the agents as a whole,
according to their expressed priorities. Interestingly, ≺α is
also additively representable. We present a stronger result,
whose proof is very similar to that of Lemma 4, changing the
utility function from 2u0(x) to (k + 1)u0(x).
Lemma 6. There exist utility functions ui, 1≤i≤k such that









We study now the properties of ≺α in terms of social
choice. That is, we view the problem of deciding a collec-
tive ordering out of a profile α of orderings ≺i provided by a
set A of k agents as a problem of studying the social welfare
functions f that associate to a profile α a collective ordering
≺α, i.e. f : (≺1, . . . ,≺n) 7→≺α. The collective ordering
resulting from α by applying f is denoted by ≺α. We focus
in particular on the following properties of f .
• weakly Pareto efficiency for every i ∈ A, W ≺i W ′,
then W ≺α W ′;
• anonymity for every permutation σ of the set of agents
A, f(≺1, . . . ,≺k) = f(≺σ(1), . . . ,≺σ(k)); and
• monotonicity for every two profiles α and α′ such that
{i∈A | W≺iW ′} in α is included in {i∈A | W≺iW ′}
in α′, if W ≺α W ′, then W ≺α′ W ′.
By Lemma 6, we can represent≺α by means of a utility func-
tion uα that sums the agents’ utility levels. Therefore, when
≺α is obtained by means of Definition 5, ≺α satisfies weak
Pareto efficiency, anonymity, and monotonicity. For instance,
weak Pareto can be established as follows. Every ≺i can
be represented by a utility function according to Lemma 4.
Therefore, we have that for every agent the utility of W is
strictly greater than the utility of W ′. Since by Lemma 6, ≺α
is represented by a utility function that sums individual utili-
ties, the collective value ofW is strictly greater than the value
of W ′, which entails W ≺α W ′.
These properties are appealing in our context: anonymity
means that we do not have any information about the most
reliable agents, monotonicity entails sensitivity to the con-
sensus provided by the agents, and weak Pareto, as usual,
provides a measure of the efficiency of the outcome. In par-
ticular, every minimal element w.r.t. the collective ordering
is Pareto optimal: to increase the satisfaction of one agent
requires decreasing that of another agent.1 Additionally, if
W ⊂ W ′, then W ′ is necessarily collectively strictly better
than W . Hence, to find a collectively best repair, it suffices to
find a collectively best consistent (CBC) set of axioms.
Example 1. Consider the agenda ΦLP on Table 1. There are
three maximally consistent sets in ΦLP , which are ΦLP \{1},
ΦLP \ {3}, and ΦLP \ {8}. Consider also two voters with
orderings 11 <1 10 <1 9 <1 8 <1 7 <1 6 <1 5 <1
4 <1 3 <1 2 <1 1 and 1 <2 7 <2 3 <2 4 <2 2 <2
5 <2 9 <2 6 <2 8 <2 11 <2 10. The reference ontology
Oref = ΦLP \ {8}, that is, the agenda minus axiom 8 is a
collectively best consistent subset of ΦLP .
1Notice a significant difference w.r.t. Arrovian aggregation: the
universal domain assumption fails due to Definition 3. For instance,
the set of all axioms is always preferred by every agent to any of its







7. RaiseWelfare v LeftPolicy
8. RaiseWelfare v ¬RaiseWages
9. TaxHighIncomes v LeftPolicy
10. LeftPolicy v RaiseWages unionsq RaiseWelfare unionsq TaxHighIncomes
11. RaiseWages v LeftPolicy
Table 1: Agenda ΦLP .
First we study the complexity of finding a CBC ontology
or, more precisely, its decision variant: given ontology T with
|T | = m, a set α of lexicographic orderings over T , and an
m-tuple θ, decide whether there is a consistent subontology S
such that Sα <lex θ. We call this the optimal repair problem.
Theorem 7. If ontology consistency is in the class C, then
optimal repair is in the class NPC.
Corollary 8. Optimal repair problem is EXPTIME-complete
in ALC and PSPACE-complete in ALC w.r.t. acyclic TBoxes.
4 Vote Aggregation Mechanism
We present a model that extends Judgment Aggregation for
the case of ontologies [Porello and Endriss, 2014]. Recall
that the agenda Φ may be inconsistent. We denote the set of
all the consistent subontologies of Φ as On(Φ).
Given a set A = {1, . . . , k} of agents, the voting mecha-
nism asks each agent i ∈ A to provide a consistent ontology
Oi ∈ On(Φ). An ontology profile is a vector of the form
O = (O1, . . . , Ok) ∈ On(Φ)k of consistent ontologies, one
for each agent. The set of agents including the axiom ϕ in
their ontology under profileO is AOϕ := {i ∈ A | ϕ ∈ Oi}.
Definition 9 (Ontology aggregators). An ontology aggrega-
tor is a function F : On(Φ)k → 2Φ mapping any profile of
consistent ontologies to an ontology.
According to this definition, the ontology we obtain as the
outcome of an aggregation process may be inconsistent. This
is the case of e.g. the majority rule, which is nonetheless
widely applied in any political scenarios. The majority rule is
defined as follows.
Definition 10 (Absolute majority rule). The absolute major-
ity rule is the ontology aggregator Fm mapping each O ∈
On(Φ)k to the ontology Fm(O) =
{
ϕ ∈ Φ | ∣∣AOϕ ∣∣ > k/2}.
We illustrate it with an example.
Example 2. Consider three voters, voting on the agenda
ΦLP of Figure 1 as follows:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Voter 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Voter 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
Voter 3 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
Majority 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
Algorithm 1 VoteBasedCollectiveOntology(Φ, (<i)i, (Oi)i)
Oref ← ReferenceOntology(Φ, (<i)i)
R← F ((Oi)i)
while R is inconsistent do
BadAx← FindBadAxiom(R)
WeakerAx←WeakenAxiom(BadAx, Oref)
R← R\{BadAx} ∪ {WeakerAx}
Return R
It is easy to see that each voter’s vote represents a consistent
set of axioms. Nonetheless, the majority chooses axioms 1, 3,
and 8 among others. The set {1, 3, 8} is inconsistent.
We propose to repair inconsistent ontologies obtained from
the aggregation of individual ontologies. When the aggre-
gated ontology F (O) is inconsistent, we can adopt a general
strategy based on axiom weakening to repair it. The first step
is to compute a reference ontology that the agents agree with.
For this step, we require all agents to express their prefer-
ences in the form of a total ordering between the axioms in
the agenda Φ, and compute one of the CBCs, as described in
Section 3. This reference ontology, denoted as Oref, will be
used as the basis for the definition of the refinement opera-
tors. In this way, the generalisations of the axioms will take
into account the collective opinion of all the agents.
Once the reference ontology Oref has been computed,
and as long as F (O) remains inconsistent, we select a
“bad axiom” and replace it with a random weakening of it
with respect to Oref; see Algorithm 1. The subprocedure
FindBadAxiom(O) samples a number of minimally incon-
sistent subsets I1, I2, . . . Ik ⊆ O and returns one axiom from
the ones occurring the most often, i.e., an axiom from the set
argmaxϕ∈O(|{j | ϕ ∈ Ij and 1 ≤ j ≤ k}|). The subproce-
dure WeakenAxiom(ϕ,Oref) randomly returns one axiom in
gOref(ϕ) which is weaker than ϕ.
Example 3. We continue Example 2, where the majority
elected an inconsistent subset of ΦLP , viz., {1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 11}.
Consider the following preference orderings over ΦLP .
<1= 3 < 1 < 5 < 2 < 4 < 6 < 7 < 8 < 9 < 10 < 11
<2= 3 < 7 < 8 < 9 < 10 < 11 < 4 < 5 < 6 < 2 < 1
<3= 1 < 2 < 5 < 7 < 8 < 11 < 9 < 3 < 4 < 6 < 10
The subset ΦLP \ {8} is again a CBC, and is chosen as ref-
erence ontology Oref.
Out of {1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 11}, the algorithm then randomly
chooses between the axioms 1, 3, and 8, which are the
“bad” axioms responsible for the inconsistency. Say it
picks axiom 1: RaiseWages(Switzerland). Among the
weakenings of axiom 1, there is LeftPolicy(Switzerland)
which is used to replace axiom 1. The set of axioms
{LeftPolicy(Switzerland), 3, 5, 7, 8, 11} is consistent, and the
vote aggregation mechanism is over.
Clearly, substituting an axiom ϕ with an element from
gOref(ϕ) cannot diminish the set of models of an ontology.
By Equation 1 and Lemma 2 any GCI is a finite number of
refinement steps away from the trivial axiom ⊥ v >. Any
assertion C(a) is also a finite number of generalisations away
from the trivial assertion >(a). It follows that by repeatedly
Tolerant Strict
Voting Turn Voting Turn
dcmitype 0.91 0.94 0.78 0.73
elig 0.89 0.91 0.77 0.67
gco 0.91 0.93 0.80 0.73
icd11 0.88 0.91 0.76 0.69
pgxo 0.89 0.91 0.78 0.66
pseudo 0.90 0.93 0.77 0.64
ptrans 0.89 0.90 0.76 0.64
Table 2: Average agent happiness (tolerant and strict) for the ontolo-
gies considered and for voting and turn aggregation approaches.
replacing an axiom with one of its weakenings, the weaken-
ing procedure will eventually obtain an ontology with some
interpretations. Hence, the algorithm terminates.
5 Turn-Based Mechanism
In the turn-based procedure, the agents engage in a turn-based
rational negotiation about the axioms to be added to the col-
lective ontology. As in the case of the voting procedure the
agents share an agenda and furnish a total order over the ax-
ioms in the agenda. They also choose which axioms, among
the most preferred ones, they want to propose during their
turns.
Algorithm 2 TurnBasedCollectiveOntology(Φ, (<i)i, (Oi)i)




while not all agents have finished do





while R ∪ {Ax} is inconsistent do
Ax←WeakenAxiom(Ax, Oref)
R← R ∪ {Ax}
Agent← (Agent (mod |A|)) + 1
Return R
Algorithm 2 works as follows. We compute a reference
ontology Oref of the agenda using the orders provided by the
agents, and set the collective ontology R to empty.
By turn, the agents consider their next preferred axiom in
their set Oi of chosen axioms. If an agent i does not have
any more axioms to propose (i.e., TreatedAxioms ⊆ Oi),
then it has finished. Otherwise, agent i picks its favorite
axiom Ax in the set (Φ \ TreatedAxioms) ∩ Oi through
FavoriteUntreatedAxiom(<i, Oi). As long as R ∪ {Ax} is
inconsistent, the agent weaken it w.r.t. the collective refer-
ence ontology. Then a weaker version of Ax is added to R.
This is repeated until all agents have processed all their cho-
sen axioms. It is easy to see that this algorithm terminates.
6 Experiments
With the experiments we aim at understanding which one of
the proposed collective repairing procedures is preferable un-
der which conditions. To this end, we compare them by defin-
ing the concept of agent happiness from two perspectives:
• Tolerant Happiness: an agent is tolerantly happy when
their chosen axioms are in (or follow from) the collective
repaired ontology, regardless of whether this ontology
also entails further statements.
• Strict Happiness: an agent is strictly happy when their
chosen axioms are in (or follow from) the collective on-
tology and everything that follows from the collective
ontology also follows from their own chosen axioms.
To formally define these concepts, we take into account
both the logical axioms in a given ontology and the set of
inferred class hierarchies that can be obtained from it. To
this end, given a consistent ontology O, we define
Inf(O) = {A v B : A,B ∈ NC , O |= A v B} .
The agent happiness can then be defined by checking how
many logical axioms in the ontology of the agent and how
many inferred class hierarchies are provable w.r.t. the collec-
tive ontology.
Definition 11. LetOi be the set of axioms chosen by an agent
i, and O be a consistent collective ontology, we define:
• the tolerant agent happiness TolH(O|Oi) as
|{ϕ ∈ Oi ∪ Inf(Oi) s.t. O |= ϕ}|
|Oi ∪ Inf(Oi)| ;
• the strict agent happiness StrH(O|Oi) as
|{ϕ ∈ Oi ∪ Inf(Oi) ∪O ∪ Inf(O) s.t. O |= ϕ and Oi |= ϕ}|
|Oi ∪ Inf(Oi) ∪O ∪ Inf(O)| .
We evaluated our aggregation approaches over 7 ontologies
from BioPortal [Matentzoglu and Parsia, 2017]. We com-
pared the agents’ happiness of the collective repairing by vot-
ing and weakening (Algorithm 1) with the ones of the turn-
based procedure (Algorithm 2) by first making the ontologies
inconsistent through the addition of random axioms. We also
considered, as baselines, the approach unanimity which takes
the intersection of the votes of all agents (i.e., the ontology ag-
gregator Fu(O) := {ϕ ∈ Φ | |AOϕ | = k}), and the approach
removal which removes random axioms from the (inconsis-
tent) global agenda until consistency is achieved.
We made each ontology inconsistent 250 times, by select-
ing 10% of the axioms in an ontology to generate inconsis-
tent subclass axiom chains. Each time and for each agent i,
we randomly generated a preference order <i, and chose the
individual ontology to be a consistent set of the best axioms
of the agenda w.r.t. <i. We then built up two collective on-
tologies running Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2. Finally, we
measured the average agent happiness (strict and tolerant) for
our aggregation procedures.
Our hypothesis was that our procedure would yield bet-
ter agents’ happiness than the removal- and unanimity-based
(a) Average agent tolerant happiness. (b) Average agent strict happiness.
Figure 1: Average agent happiness using our two methods (voting, turn) and two baselines (unanimity, removal).
procedures. Furthermore, we expected the turn-based ap-
proach to prove itself better than the voting-based approach
insofar as tolerant-based agent happiness is concerned, but
not with respect to strict agent happiness, due to the fact that
voting allows a majority of agents to reject axioms proposed
by others while this is not the case in the turn-based approach.
On the other hand, we expected the voting-based procedure to
be preferable w.r.t. strict happiness: under this regime a ma-
jority of agents can force any axiom they disagree with not
to appear in the collective ontology, but in the turn-based ap-
proach there is no such guarantee. As shown in Figure 1 and
Table 2, the results of our experiments strongly confirm our
hypothesis2 and illustrate the benefits of our weakening-based
approach to ontology aggregation.
7 Related Work
Axiom weakening was introduced as a technique to re-
pair inconsistent ontologies from the perspective of a sin-
gle agent [Troquard et al., 2018]. Here, we repair socially
aggregated ontologies. Other works relate to axiom weak-
ening from different perspectives. E.g., a similarly gen-
eral approach to axiom weakening (and generalization) has
been considered in ontology learning [Lehmann and Hitzler,
2010] and in conceptual blending [Confalonieri et al., 2018],
whereas finding explanations in ontologies to identify parts of
axioms that caused inconsistency—to then modify those ax-
ioms instead of removing them—was explored in [Horridge
et al., 2008; 2012].
The problem of integrating ontologies has been addressed
from the perspective of ontology alignment and matching
(e.g., [Euzenat, 2015; 2017; Solimando et al., 2017; Jime´nez-
Ruiz et al., 2016]). Although we share the main motivation—
viz., aggregating ontologies—our approach is intrinsically
2Via Wilcoxon signed-rank significance testing with Holm-
Bonferroni correction for multiple tests. For pseudo, we did not
observe a significant difference between removal and turn-based ap-
proaches; otherwise, our hypotheses were all confirmed.
different from ontology alignment approaches in the litera-
ture. Using the terminology of [Euzenat, 2015], our ontolo-
gies are always “locally” consistent, and typically “globally”
inconsistent. This is the assumption in the setting of judg-
ment aggregation and computational social choice. Since
we deal with global inconsistency, we repair the integrated
ontology straightaway by means of axiom weakening. Fur-
thermore, unlike [Euzenat, 2017; Jime´nez-Ruiz et al., 2016;
Solimando et al., 2017], our framework is not looking for on-
tology alignments: all individual ontologies are indeed sub-
sets of the same agenda, therefore, we do not focus on identi-
fying correspondences between entities of agents’ ontologies.
Another approach worth mentioning is [Trojahn et al.,
2010]. The authors compare different argumentation frame-
works where agents use argumentation to decide which on-
tology matching technique to adopt. In our turn-based proce-
dure, all the agents share the same repairing techniques, and
they do not negotiate over the axioms. It suffices to guarantee
that added axioms (or their weakened version) keep the inte-
grated ontology consistent. On the other hand, arguing about
the quality and informativeness of the axioms to be included
in the repaired ontology can be an interesting aspect to be
investigated as an extension of our framework.
8 Conclusions and Future Work
We presented two approaches to ontology aggregation. In the
voting-based approach, the vote of agents (over the axioms of
an agenda) is aggregated to build a collective ontology, and,
then, the ontology is repaired by weakening its axioms. In the
turn-based approach, the agents are involved in a turn-based
dialogue, where at each step they add axioms to the aggre-
gated ontology, and weaken them if needed. Both approaches
have the advantage of generating an aggregated ontology that
is consistent. Both methods make critical use of a reference
ontology to weaken axioms, and we formally defined a prin-
cipled method to select it.
As shown in this work, axiom weakening can play an im-
portant role in both of these scenarios. In voting-based ag-
gregation mechanisms, weakening allows us to make use of
a much wider range of aggregation procedures, regardless of
whether they can preserve consistency. In turn-based aggre-
gation mechanisms, weakening allows agents to “settle” on
weaker versions of their preferred axioms for addition to the
aggregated ontology, if the stronger versions would cause in-
consistencies. Our results are strongly indicative of the rele-
vance of axiom weakening to ontology aggregation.
As future work, we aim at exploring different weakening
operators (which, in practical applications, would also require
expert input in order to select among different weakenings of
a given axiom) and studying the effect of various parameters
(e.g., the sparsity of the agent ontologies) on the relative ef-
fectiveness of the approaches described here.
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